Cellular networks have evolved through various generations, starting with 1G, followed by 2G and then by 3G, cellular networks have come a long way. A recent technology that has marked the beginning of 4G is Long Term Evolution (LTE). While transmission technologies, authentication mechanisms, confidentiality protection, etc., improved significantly through the generations, not much has improved with regards to the subscriber's identity privacy, and LTE is no exception. Much of this could be due to the trust model adopted in these networks. Introduction of sensitive services like mobile-banking, mobile-commerce, etc., has increased the importance of identity privacy by many folds. Identification of threats like location tracking and comprehensive profiling -where data about movement, usage, etc., of a subscriber is amassed and linked to his/her identity to explore various attacks -is quite alarming. In this paper, we propose a new trust model for strengthening identity privacy in cellular networks; it has an additional capacity to enhance interoperability among different cellular operators. We also propose a security extension that adopts this trust model to improve identity privacy and interoperability in LTE. A formal analysis of the extension proves that it meets its security goals.
INTRODUCTION
In all cellular networks, a common basic architectural framework is used; in which, three parties are involved viz. an User Equipment (UE), the Home Network (HN) and a Serving Network (SN). The UE that a subscriber owns is registered with the HN. The association between the UE and the HN is created from the moment the subscriber procures a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) from the HN and fits it into his/her UE. The HN offers services to its registered UEs through SNs that are located within or outside its own service area. Communication between the UE and the SN happens through radio link, whereas communication between the SN and the HN happens through wired medium. The radio link is considered vulnerable to various kind of attacks as it is too open by nature for comfort of adversaries, whereas the wired link is considered secure [8] . In order to uniquely identify a subscriber for authentication, authorisation and billing purposes, the HN assigns a unique permanent identity called International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IM SI) [4] to the UE. The IM SI is a valuable information that should not be accessible to anyone except the HN. Its compromise will expose the subscriber to threats like location tracking and comprehensive profiling -where data about movement, usage, etc., of a subscriber is amassed and linked to his/her identity to explore various attacks at a later time. For the UE to access a particular service, it has to go through an Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure. During an AKA, the UE has to send a service request along with its identity to the SN. The SN in turn, obtains relevant authentication data from the HN by presenting the identity that it received from the UE. It then authenticates the UE using a challenge response mechanism [13] . Due to the current trust model adopted by cellular networks, there are occasions during identity presentation in the AKA procedure, when the IM SI needs to be transmitted to the SN in clear text through the vulnerable radio path [10] . Moreover, the current trust model requires the SNs to be considered trustworthy, undermining the threat that a compromised third party SN may pose. Such requirement demands unconditional trust and thus limits interoperability. In this paper, we propose a new trust model that has the potential to not only enhance identity privacy, but also to boost interoperability among cellular operators. We also propose a security extension that implements this trust model in LTE. A formal analysis of the extension is performed to prove that it meets its security goals. The rest of the article is organised as follows: in section 2, we discuss the current trust model; in section 3, we propose a new trust model; in section 4, we present the security architecture of LTE; in section 5, we discuss Evolved Packet System AKA (EPS-AKA) protocol: the AKA protocol adopted in LTE; in section 6, we discuss the identity privacy related vulnerabilities present in EPS-AKA; in section 7, we propose a new security extension for EPS-AKA; in section 8, we discuss the strong points of the proposed extension; in section 9, we perform a formal analysis of the proposed extension; finally, we conclude the paper in section 10.
CURRENT TRUST MODEL
In the current trust model, the following trust requirements with reference to the permanent identity of a subscriber exist. UE → HN : As the UE is registered and has a direct service agreement with the HN, it is bound to fully trust the HN with its IM SI. HN → SN : Since HN serves its subscribers through SNs, the HN confers full trust in the SN with regards to the IM SI of a subscriber. For authentication, authorisation and billing purposes, the IM SI is exchanged unabated between the HN and the SN.
UE → SN : This trust relation is a transitive outcome of the previous two trust relations; because of which, the UE fully trusts the SN with its IM SI and it transmits its IM SI immediately upon receiving a request from the SN.
From the above trust requirements, one can easily understand that even though the SN may belong to an untrusted third party cellular operator, the UE and the HN is required to confer unconditional trust on it. As a result, there exists several vulnerabilities, which an adversary may explore to compromise identity privacy of the subscriber. Moreover, such trust requirements are impractical in today's context when multiple cellular operators need to interoperate among each other to offer wider coverage to the subscribers. Roaming agreements with third party operators to provide service in a location where an operator has not set up its own infrastructure is a common practice. Thus, the need of the time is a paradigm shift that looks at the trust issues from a different perspective: a perspective that gives more emphasis on issues like privacy and interoperability.
PROPOSED TRUST MODEL
In this section, we propose a new trust model that is more flexible compared to the current trust model adopted by the cellular networks. In this, there is only one trust requirement, which is as follows:
UE → HN : The UE should trust only the HN with which it is registered and no one else. The IM SI should not be shared with any third party and in no situation should leave the UE or the HN.
The above trust model will strengthen identity privacy, as the IM SI is not shared with any one except the HN. It will also improve interoperability among cellular operators, since the requirement to trust the SN with respect to the permanent identity is totally relaxed. In order to adopt this model to provide improved identity privacy, an alternate mechanism for identity presentation, which can be used in all situations when an IM SI is used otherwise, has to be formulated. To adopt this model even with respect to confidentiality and integrity protection of user data, end to end application layer based ciphering and integrity protection solutions like IPsec can be used [12] . With cellular networks gradually moving towards all-IP, such solutions will not be too hard to implement. Fig. 1 depicts a simplified view of the roaming security architecture of an Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) [3] that serves as the core of LTE. In this, we show only the key elements associated with the AKA procedure used in LTE. Each and every user is registered with a Home public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN) (which, is the HN of the user) with their subscription and profile information stored in a Home Subscriber Server (HSS). In the Visiting Public Land Mobile Network (VPLM) (which, is the SN of the user), the User Equipment (UE) connects with an evolved NodeB (eNB) through the Uu interface, for attach, Tracking Area Update (TAU) and service requests. eNB is the new enhanced Base Transceiver Station (BTS) that provides the LTE air interface and performs radio resource management for the evolved access system. An eNB is connected with one or more Mobility Management Entities (MME) through the S1-MME interface. The MME is the key control node for the LTE access network and is responsible for authenticating the user by interacting with the HSS. For obtaining authentication data, the MME communicates with the HSS through the S6a interface. There are two layers of security between the UE and the E-UTRAN. The first layer is called the Access Stratum (AS) which protects the Radio Resource Control (RRC) plane signalling and the User Plane (UP) data between the UE and the eNB. The second layer is called the Non Access Stratum (NAS) which protects the control plane signalling between the UE and the MME. UE has access to packet data through the Packet Data Network Gateway (PDN-GW) via the Serving Gateway (S-GW).
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF LTE

EPS-AKA
EPS-AKA [2] is the AKA procedure used in LTE; it produces keying material forming a basis for UP, RRC, and NAS ciphering keys as well as RRC and NAS integrity protection keys. EPS-AKA during the initial connection and successive connections are as follows:
The Initial Connection
For the initial connection (when the subscriber switches on the UE for the first time), the UE transmits an attach request to the MME. Since the UE does not have a temporary identity at this moment, its IM SI is included in this request. The EPS-AKA procedure during the initial connection is as follows:
(1) The MME invokes the procedure by requesting authentication data from the HSS. The request shall include the IM SI and the SN/MME identity. (2) Upon receipt of the request, the HSS assembles an Universal Mobile Telecommunication System -Authentication Vector (U M T S-AV ) [1] . An U M T S-AV contains a random part RAN D, an authenticator token AU T N used for authenticating the network to the UE, an expected response XRES, a 128-bit Integrity Key IK, and a 128-bit Cipher Key CK.
The AU T N contains a sequence number SQN used to indicate freshness of the AV . An EP S-AV is then derived from U M T S-AV by replacing CK and IK with a Key for Access Security Management Entity (K ASM E ). To derive K ASM E , a Key Derivation Function (KDF) [2] is used that take the following input parameters: CK, IK and SN/MME identity. Thus,
The HSS then sends EP S-AV back to the MME. (3) After receiving EP S-AV , the MME extracts RAN D and AU T N from it and sends them to the UE as a challenge. A Key Set Identifier (KSI ASM E ) is also send along with the challenge. The purpose of the KSI ASM E is to make it possible for the UE and the MME to identify a K ASM E without invoking the authentication procedure. This is used to allow re-use of the K ASM E during subsequent connections. (4) At receipt of this message, the UE runs UMTS algorithm [1] to verifiy that AU T N is correct and hereby authenticates the network. If AU T N is incorrect, the UE rejects the authentication. If AU T N is correct, the UE computes RES, IK and CK (using UMTS algorithm). It then derives the K ASM E from the newly computed IK and CK. The UE then responds back to the MME with a user authentication response message that includes the computed RES. (5) Finally, MME checks whether RES is equal to XRES. If so, the authentication is successful. If not, the MME sends an authentication reject message towards the UE.
At the end of a successful EPS-AKA, a K ASM E is shared between UE and MME. A hierarchy of keys are then generated from the K ASM E [2] to be used for protection of the NAS and the AS. The MME then allocates a fresh temporary identifier called Globally Unique Temporary Identity (GU T I) [4] to the UE by initiating a GU T I reallocation procedure through the NAS. During the GU T I reallocation procedure, the MME sends GU T I Reallocation Command to the UE and the UE returns GU T I Reallocation Complete message to the MME. A new GU T I shall be sent to the UE only after a successful activation of NAS security. A mapping between the GU T I and the IM SI of the UE is maintained at the MME. The purpose of the GU T I is to provide an unambiguous identification of the UE, so that the subscriber's permanent identity (i.e., the IM SI) is not revealed.
Subsequent Connections
For subsequent connections (during attach requests, Tracking Area Updates (TAU) and service requests), identity presentation of the UE is accomplished by transmitting a GU T I through the radio path. The KSI ASM E is also sent along with the request. Before transmitting, the UE integrity protects the request using NAS security. Upon receipt of the connection request, the MME identifies the corresponding K ASM E with the help of the received GU T I and the KSI ASM E . The MME then checks the integrity protection of the message. If the integrity check succeeds, the MME, depending on the MME policy, may either decide to reuse K ASM E that was established during a previous AKA (without invoking a fresh authentication procedure ) or may decide to go for a fresh EPS-AKA that will result in the establishment of a new K ASM E . In order to carry out a fresh EPS-AKA, the MME locates the IM SI of the UE in its local database through the IM SI-GU T I mapping and continues in the same manner as the initial connection (discussed above). In order to reuse a K ASM E a fresh set of keying material is derived form the K ASM E . Thus, the need to perform frequent AKA runs has been reduced in EPS through the use of a more elaborate key hierarchy. In particular, connection requests can be authenticated using a stored K ASM E without the need to perform a fresh AKA. Several successive connections may be secured through re-derived security contexts from the current K ASM E .
IDENTITY PRIVACY RELATED VULNERABILITIES IN EPS-AKA
In EPS-AKA, a GU T I that is obtained in the previous connection (as explained in section 5.1) is transmitted instead of the IM SI for identity presentation. The purpose of the GU T I is to provide an unambiguous identification of the UE that does not reveal the subscriber's permanent identity (i.e., the IM SI). In spite of this security arrangement, there are occasions when the IM SI may be transmitted in clear text. Some of the identity privacy related vulnerabilities in EPS-AKA are as follows:
-During the very first attach procedure the IM SI has to be transmitted in clear text(TS 33.401 [2] section 5.1.1), since no GU T I is available for identity presentation at this stage.
-The IM SI has to be transmitted in clear text through the radio link as and when the MME requests for it. The MME has provision to make such a request when it cannot map the received GU T I with the corresponding IM SI. For instance, whenever the UE visits a new MME and the new MME cannot acquire the IM SI of the UE from the old MME. Such a recovery mechanism provides an opening for a fake MME to compromise a subscribers IM SI [9] . -The SN, whose trustworthiness we question, has full knowledge about the IM SIs of all subscribers to whom it provides services. -The responsibility of creation and allocation of temporary identities (i.e., GU T I) are assigned to the MME, whose trustworthiness can itself be questioned.
Moreover, it is clearly evident that the trust model adopted in LTE is the current trust model discussed in section 2. Therefore, all the identity privacy related vulnerabilities and interoperability related drawbacks discussed in section 2 exists in LTE as well.
SECURITY EXTENSION FOR EPS-AKA
In this section, we propose a security extension for EPS-AKA to achieve improved identity privacy and enhanced interoperability in LTE. The extension protects the permanent identity of a subscriber in the radio path as well as in the wired path. Knowledge of the IM SI of a subscriber is restricted only to the UE and the HE. In the extension, a Dynamic Mobile Subscriber Identity (DM SI) is transmitted by the UE instead of the IM SI. The role of the DM SI is to randomise and mask the IM SI so that an adversary having access to a particular DM SI cannot link it with any subscriber or any previous communication. This extension is based on our work that was presented in [7] . For successful functioning of the security extension the following operator specific random number and functions are used:
RIC: Random number for Identity Confidentiality (RIC) is a random number that uniquely identifies a UE within a particular HE for an epoch of time. RIC is used to compute a DM SI as follows: Multiple (m) RICs comprising of the fresh and few previously generated RICs (RIC N ew , RIC P rev , RIC Old , etc.) are maintained at the HSS against a particular IM SI in order to ensure robustness of the protocol even when an AV gets lost in transit (or due to some reason does not get utilised). Such an arrangement ensures that a mapping between the RIC that is currently stored at the UE and the corresponding IM SI is always maintained at the HSS. An additional RIC called RIC InU se is maintained at the HSS. RIC InU se enables the MME to uniquely identify the UE as long as the later continue to stay within the former's service area. f i : This function returns a RIC that can be used to uniquely identify an UE. This is done by randomly selecting a not-inuse RIC from the RIC-Index, the later being an index for the HSS's local database consisting of n = 2 b unique RIC entries arranged in ascending order (Fig. 2) , b being the number of bits in RIC. Each RIC entry in the RIC-Index has a pointer called IMSI-Pointer against it. A RIC that is already allotted to some UE, will have its IMSI-pointer pointing to that particular row in the HSS's database, which contains the IM SI of the concerned UE. A null pointer against a particular RIC in the RIC-Index denotes that the particular RIC is (not-in-use) not allotted to any specific UE and is free to be used.
f e : This function embeds RIC into RAN D to produce ERAN D, using the long term shared secret key Ki as parameter.
f x : This function extracts RIC from ERAN D, using the long term shared secret key Ki as parameter.
Example algorithms for f e and f x are proposed in [6] . f n : This function takes in a 128 bit ERAN D and the secret key Ki as parameter and encrypts a 32 bit RIC to produce a 128 bit output called Encrypted RIC (ERIC).
f d : This function decrypts ERIC by using Ki as parameter to produce RIC.
f s : This function stores a freshly generated RIC (RIC F resh ) against a given IM SI in the HSS's database. In order to make space for RIC F resh , the oldest RIC stored against the corresponding IM SI is freed up. For example, for m = 3 with RIC N ew , RIC P rev and RIC Old as the RICs stored against the corresponding IM SI, the oldest RIC (i.e., RIC Old ) is returned to the pool of not-in-use RICs by setting a null pointer against it in the RIC-Index. RIC Old is then replaced by RIC P rev , and RIC P rev is replaced RIC N ew . Finally, RIC N ew is replaced by RIC F resh . An entry in the RIC-Index against the IMSI-Pointer of RIC F resh is also made accordingly.
RIC Old .IM SI-P ointer = null (10)
RIC Old = RIC P rev (11) 
A summary of all the cryptographic functions used in the extension is presented in table 1. An ERAN D (Say ERAN D F irst ) that has a unique RIC called RIC F irst embedded into it, is stored in the USIM's flash memory in a field called ERAN D U E before a subscriber procures it from the service provider. RIC F irst is also stored at the HSS and an entry in the RIC-Index is made accordingly. RIC F irst is meant for one time usage during the initial connection.
The Initial Connection
For the initial connection, the UE transmits an attach request that contains a DM SI (instead of the IM SI, section 5.1) calculated according to the following steps.
(1.1) The MME initiates the authentication procedure by sending a request for a fresh EP S-AV along with DM SI r to the HSS. (1.2) On receiving the request, the HSS separates RIC r from DM SI r and with the help of RIC-Index locates the corresponding IM SI and the secret key Ki of the UE in its database. It then calculates:
and checks if RIC d = RIC r . If they do not match the request is rejected. If they match, it confirms that the request has been send by the concerned UE and not by a third party with malicious intentions; RIC r is thus moved from its current position to RIC InU se using f m , and a fresh EP S-AV (EP S-AV f ) is generated as explained in section 5.1. HSS then computes
RIC F resh is then cryptographically embedded into the
A copy of RIC F resh is also stored using f s at the HSS's database. After embedding RIC F resh into RAN D f EP S-AV f looks like the following:
From now on, ERAN D f is used (instead of RAN D f ) as the effective 128 bit random number for EPS-AKA related computations. Finally, HSS sends EP S-AV f along with DM SI r back to the MME. (1.3) On receipt, MME continues the AKA procedure by extracting ERAN D f and AU T N f from EP S-AV f . ERAN D f and AU T N f are then transmitted as a challenge towards the UE. (1.4) The UE and the MME completes the remaining part of the AKA procedure following the same steps as explained in section 5.1. If the mutual authentication process is successful: -UE saves the recent ERAN D f that it has received from the MME as ERAN D U E . -The MME stores DM SI r into the field meant for storing IM SI in its local database. Let us call this field as DM SI M M E . MME continues to uniquely identify the UE with DM SI M M E till it receives a new DM SI (during a successful AKA) from the UE. (1.5) At the end of the AKA procedure, a shared K ASM E is established between the UE and the MME . The MME then allocates a new GU T I to the UE by initiating a GU T I reallocation procedure through the NAS (as explained in section 5.1). MME stores this GU T I against DM SI M M E in its local database. The GU T I is also stored in the UE's memory (say in a field called GU T I U E ) for identity presentation during the next authentication.
Subsequent Connections
For all subsequent connections and the corresponding AKA procedure, the UE may present its identity in two different ways:
(i) By transmitting a GUTI received in the previous AKA: In this case, UE transmits the GU T I stored in GU T I U E . Out of the two options, this one is the preferred option since it reduces authentication latency (as the authentication procedure happens locally between the UE and the MME without involving the HE). (ii) By transmitting a fresh DMSI: This option is less preferred and the UE may be forced to opt for this option when the UE roams into the area of a new MME or when the MME cannot identify the UE with its current GU T I.
The protocol flow for subsequent authentications through the transmission of a fresh DM SI is same as that of the initial connection (i.e., step 1.1 through 1.5). The protocol flow for subsequent connections through the transmission of GU T I is as follows:
(2.1) UE extracts GU T I U E from its memory and transmits it to the MME. (2.2) Through this GU T I, MME identifies the corresponding DM SI (ie. DM SI M M E stored in its database). MME then sends a request for a fresh AV to the HSS along with DM SI M M E . 
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE EXTENSION
The key achievements of the proposed extension may be summarised as follows:
-End to end identity privacy: Knowledge of IM SI is confined only to the UE and the HSS; it is never transmitted at any stage of the network. -Enhanced interoperability: MME to MME as well as HSS/UE to MME trust relationship requirement with respect to the permanent identity (i.e. IM SI) is relaxed; thereby, enhancing interoperability among cellular operators. -No impact at the MME/SN: As no extra computation is introduced at the MME, the adoption of the extension in EPS-AKA will be easy. The extension can be adopted with minor modifications at the UE and the HSS (without requiring any modification at the intermediary network that may even belong to a third party). -Reduced communication overhead: The extension reduces two protocol messages. Unlike EPS-AKA, during handover, the extension does not need the current MME to communicate with the previous MME to acquire the permanent identity of the UE. Instead, a DM SI is directly sent to the new MME.
FORMAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform a formal analysis of the proposed security extension through an enhanced BAN logic [5] called AUT-LOG [11] . Through this analysis, the security goals described in the following subsection are proven to be achieved by the extension.
Security Goals
IM SI should be a shared secret between the UE and the HN/HSS; it should not be disclosed to any third party including the SN/MME:
GU T Is and DM SIs are transmitted in lieu of the IM SI of a UE. During every successful run of the protocol, if the UE receives a fresh GU T I and a fresh DM SI, it can easily protect its IM SI (section 7).
-G3: U E believes U E has GU T I -G4: U E believes f resh(GU T I) -G5: U E believes U E has DM SI -G6: U E believes f resh(DM SI) It should not be possible to link a GU T I with the corresponding DM SI and a DM SI with the corresponding IM SI.
Prerequisites
UE recognises Ki and believes that it is a good key for communication with HSS:
Since UE is capable of verifying freshness of SEQ, it believes in SEQ s freshness.
U E believes f resh(SEQ)
UE regards the following messages as atomic messages
UE believes that it has not said enc(Ki, SEQ, ERAN D).
Where enc is an encryption function.
U E believes ¬(U E said enc(Ki, SEQ, ERAN D)) (31)
As K ASM E is generated from ERAN D (section 5.1) -UE believes that if HSS says ERAN D, it means that the cipher key (say N AS enc ) generated from K ASM E is a good key for encryption of the NAS.
UE believes that HSS controls the freshness of RIC and that if HSS says ERAN D with a fresh SEQ, the RIC contained it in is also fresh. 
U E believes HSS controls f resh(RIC)
UE has a unique IM SI that constitutes of M CC, M N C and Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (M SIN ).
U E believes U E has M CC (36)
U E believes U E has M N C
UE believes that the MME has jurisdiction and belief regarding the freshness of GU T I.
U E believes M M E controls f resh(GU T I)
U E believes M M E believes f resh(GU T I))
UE believes that HSS has jurisdiction and belief concerning the IM SI as a shared secret between the UE and the HSS. UE believes that MME controls and believes that without access to the MME's local database, GU T I cannot be linked in any way with the corresponding DM SI.
U E believes M M E controls ¬(GU T I ≡ DM SI) (45)
U E believes (M M E says enc(N AS enc , GU T I) −→ M M E believes ¬(GU T I ≡ DM SI)) (46) UE believes it has not said enc(N AS enc , GU T I) itself.
U E believes ¬(U E said enc(N AS enc , GU T I)) 
48, 52
H1,H3
− −−− → U E has SEQ (53)
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the research contributed to understanding the importance and the current status of subscriber's identity privacy in cellular network. It is observed that, even though a cell phone is now being used for various types of sensitive services, the status of identity privacy has not quite improved. The trust model that was being adopted may be blamed for this. With more and more operators taking a plunge into the competitive cellular market, interoperability is a key issue. A major factor that influence the ease at which interoperation may happen between cellular operators, depends on the flexibility of the trust model adopted by a cellular network. In this article, we put forward a trust model that may help in improving the status of identity privacy and as an additional benefit may make interoperability between cellular operators easier.
